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LIMDIS; FOR LORD EYES ONLY FROM BARTHOLOMEW

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: OVIPKISSINGER, H. A., UNGA, PARM

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S UNGA SPEECH - NON-PROLIFERATION SECT.

REF: TOSEC 270266; SECTO 27111

1. HERE IS A NEW DRAFT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION SECTION.

CORE OF ANALYTICAL APPROACH IN THIS DRAFT IS NUCLEAR

CONTROL BALANCED BY SUPPLY AND SUPPORTED BY COMMON POLITI-

CAL INTEREST AND PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT. IN ARTICULATING

THIS APPROACH, WE DREW FROM ANALYSIS OF FUEL CYCLE PROBLEM

IN EARLIER STRATEGY PAPER BUT CONCLUDED THAT THREE

SEPARATE STAGES OF CONTROLS (SAFEGUARDS, RESTRAINT,

STORAGE), EACH EXPLICITLY DESIGNED TO KEEP NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS OUT OF NNWS HANDS, WOULD MAKE UNGA CONFIDENTIAL

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SPEECH APPEAR EXCESSIVELY RESTRICTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY.

HOWEVER, EACH STAGE IS REFLECTED IN SUBSTANCE OF DRAFT AND

CONTINUES TO BE OFFSET BY EMPHASIS ON INCENTIVES AND COMMON INTEREST. AND, WE ARE SOMEWHAT NERVOUS ABOUT

DIDACTIC TONE WHICH INEVITABLY CREEPS INTO MORE ELABORATE

EXPLANATION OF CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PROLIFERATION.

INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF PROLIFERATION DANGERS HAVE

SIGNIFICANTLY SHIFTED SINCE 1974. BECAUSE OF THIS AND

FACT THAT PREVIOUS UNGA SPEECHES DELVED INTO ECONOMIC,

POLITICAL AND MILITARY BACKGROUND, CASE CAN BE MADE FOR

BRIEF PROVOCATIVE SETTING AND EMPHASIS ON DILEMMAS AND

SOLUTIONS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: THE MENACE OF WIDESPREAD PROLIFERATION OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THE WORLD FACES TODAY RAISES

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MANKIND'S CAPACITY TO UNDER-

STAND AND RESPOND TO A CHALLENGE TO ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

3. FOR THREE GENERATIONS THE WORLD HAS ENDURED A SITUATION

IN WHICH A STRATEGIC BALANCE PERILOUSLY MAINTAINED

BETWEEN A RELATIVELY FEW NATIONS HAS DETERRED THE

CATASTROPHE OF NUCLEAR WAR.

4. BUT NOW, A WHOLLY NEW SITUATION IMPENDS, AS WE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFRONT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SCORES OF NATIONS MAY COME

TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW, IT IS POSSIBLE TO

FORESEE THAT THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES COULD

WELL BECOME THE REPEATED RESORT OF THOSE SEEKING TO QUICKLY

PREVAIL IN REGIONAL DISPUTES IN EVERY QUARTER OF THE

GLOBE. NOW, IT IS POSSIBLE TO FORESEE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AS PAWNS TO BE STRUGGLED OVER IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS.

AND NOW, WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT UNLESS WE ACT TOGETHER

TO REVERSE CURRENT TRENDS, THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR

DEVASTATION WILL INCREASE VASTLY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

5. THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS INCREMENTAL.

THE DANGER DOES NOT APPEAR FULL-BLOWN ALL AT ONCE. IT

IS POSSIBLE EACH STEP OF THE WAY TO SAY THAT THE ULTIMATE

THREAT NEED NOT YET BE FACED.

6. YET THE DIRECTION IN WHICH EVENTS

ARE DRIFTING IS ALL TOO CLEAR -- AND ALL TOO DANGEROUS.

OBVIOUSLY WE FACE A CHALLENGE OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE.

OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO TAKE STEPS NOW -- TO ACT BEFORE

THE OBSTACLES ARE OVERWHELMING.

7. WE MUST LOOK TO THE SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM. WHAT

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ARE THE MOTIVATIONS WHICH CAN LEAD TO PROLIFERATION OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS? AND WHAT WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCES?

8. THERE IS TODAY AMONG NATIONS A RAPIDLY GROWING INTEREST

IN THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMS.

BUT THERE ARE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS AND CON-

SIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE AS WELL.

-- THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY

PROGRAMS ARE INCREASINGLY EVIDENT. SINCE THE 1973 ENERGY

CRISIS AND CONSEQUENT DRASTIC RISE IN OIL PRICES, MANY

NATIONS HAVE TURNED TOWARD NUCLEAR ENERGY, AS A MEANS

BOTH OF LOWERING THE COST OF GENERATING ELECTRICITY AND OF

REDUCING THEIR RELIANCE UPON IMPORTED PETROLEUM.

-- IN AN AGE OF GROWING NATIONALISM, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR

POWER DEVELOPMENT HAS COME TO BE VIEWED AS A MEANS OF

ENHANCING A NATION'S PRESTIGE.

-- AND IN A WORLD OF CONTINUING REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND

CONFRONTATION, SOME HAVE VIEWED THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR

FACILITIES AS PROVIDING AN OPTION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO ENHANCE MILITARY SECUR-

ITY OR POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

9. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF OUR TIME MAKE IT CRUCIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR THE WORLD'S NATIONS TO PERSIST IN SEEKING ALTERNATIVE

SOURCES OF ENERGY TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON INEXORABLY

DWINDLING FOSSIL FUELS. YET IF THESE FORCES ULTIMATELY

RESULT IN WIDESPREAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, NO

ONE WILL GAIN. ALL WILL LOSE.

10. IN THE LONG TERM NO NATION CAN HOPE TO GAIN POLITI-

CALLY OR MILITARILY FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- POLITICAL PRESTIGE CAN NO LONGER BE CAPTURED BY SUCH

A DECISION IN AN AGE WHEN THE USE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR

ENERGY IS BECOMING COMMONPLACE. AND WHEN THE CONSTRUCTTON

OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IS WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF

NATIONS ON EVERY CONTINENT, THERE CAN BE NO RATIONAL

EXPECTATION THAT NATIONS CAN THEREBY DEMONSTRATE

TECHNOLOGICAL PRE-EMINENCE.

-- ADVANTAGES IN LOCAL BALANCES OF POWER MAY COME FOR A

TIME. BUT TEMPORARY GAINS WILL SOON BE OFFSET AS POTEN-

TIAL OPPONENTS INEVITABLY MOVE TO REDRESS PERCEIVED

MILITARY IMBALANCES. WHILE NATIONS WHICH HOPE TO BENEFIT

FROM THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES WILL FIND THOSE

HOPES ILLUSORY, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL NATIONS WILL BE

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REAL, AND SEVERE, CREATING MASSIVE RISKS OF OBLITERATION

OF ENTIRE SOCIETIES. ALL NATIONS WOULD BE FACED WITH

ENVIRONMENTS -- REGIONAL AND GLOBAL -- OF INTENSIFIED

UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL.

11. MAINTAINING GLOBAL STABILITY WHEN NUCLEAR POWERS ARE

LIMITED IN NUMBER IS DIFFICULT IN THE EXTREME. IN

A WORLD WITH MULTIPLE CENTERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

PEACE -- AND EXISTENCE -- COULD WELL BECOME AN IMPOS-

SIBILITY. FOR THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT NUCLEAR-

ARMED ADVERSARIES IN SUCH A WORLD WOULD ALWAYS BE DETERRED

FROM USING OR THREATENING TO USE SUCH WEAPONS.

12. NOR COULD THERE BE ANY CONFIDENCE THAT CONVENTIONAL

CONFRONTATIONS WOULD NOT ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR EXCHANGES.

DECISION-MAKERS OPERATING UNDER CONDITIONS OF WIDE PROLIF-

ERATION WOULD HAVE TO COPE WITH DESTABILIZING INTERACTIONS

AMONG THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES, MUTUALLY REINFORCING MIS-

PERCEPTIONS OF READINESS TO TAKE NUCLEAR RISKS, AND

INCREASINGLY UNPREDICTABLE OUTCOMES.

13. NATIONS WHO BELIEVE THAT THEIR SECURITY WILL BE

INCREASED BY MOVING TOWARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FAIL TO

ACCOUNT FOR THE INEVITABLE REACTIONS OF OTHER STATES CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THE NEGATIVE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR BROADER

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. A COUNTRY CHOOSING NOW TO ACQUIRE

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES -- WHICH ARE TECHNICALLY EQUIVALENT

TO WEAPONS -- MUST THEREFORE ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY NOT

ONLY FOR ITS OWN ACTIONS BUT FOR ENCOURAGING NUCLEAR

PROLIFERATION TO A GREAT MANY COUNTRIES THEREAFTER.

THE TIDE OF PROLIFERATION CANNOT

BE STEMMED BY LABELLING AS "PEACEFUL" DEVICES WHICH

PALPABLY ARE CAPABLE OF MASSIVE MILITARY DESTRUCTION.

NOR SHOULD ANY GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE DOOR TO THE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL CAN BE CLOSED AS SOON AS IT IS

INSIDE.

NUCLEAR PARADOX

14. THE WORLD THEREFORE FACES A PARADOX: COUNTRIES FEEL

AN INCREASING NEED FOR NUCLEAR POWER AS A SOURCE OF

ENERGY FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS. BUT THE UNRESTRAINED

SPREAD OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY -- GIVEN IMPETUS NOT ONLY BY

LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC NEEDS BUT BY POLITICAL AND MILITARY

MOTIVATIONS -- RAISES THE STARK THREAT OF PROLIFERATING

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH ALL ITS ATTENDANT RISKS OF ACCIDENTS.

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BLACKMAIL, THEFT, TERRORISM AND USE IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

15. IN CONFRONTING THIS PARADOX, THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST

FIND WAYS TO MEET LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS WITHOUT CON-

TRIBUTING TO THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. TO

DO ANY LESS WILL PLACE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY, IF NOT

CRIPPLE ENTIRELY, THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF PEACEFUL

NUCLEAR ENERGY TO SERVE MANKIND'S NEEDS -- AS EXPORTERS

AND IMPORTERS ALIKE COME TO FEAR THAT THE PEACEFUL

BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CAN ONLY BE REALIZED AT GRAVE

RISK TO WORLD SECURITY.

16. THERE IS NO SINGLE KEY TO SUCCESS. WE HAVE NO

ALTERNATIVE BUT TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP FAIR AND

EFFECTIVE MEASURES WHICH CAN BE MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

NUCLEAR FRAMEWORK

17. THE FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION AGAINST PROLIFERATION

SHOULD RECONCILE GLOBAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR CONTROL

WITH GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLY. FOR

NUCLEAR CONTROL, OUR LINE OF ACTION MUST BE TO MOVE

TOWARD STRONGER SAFEGUARDS AND INCREASED RESTRAINT IN

SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSFERS. FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLY, WE MUST

PURSUE WITH EQUAL VIGOR A SECOND LINE OF ACTION DESIGNED CONFIDENTIAL

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TO ENSURE THE RELIABLE AND ECONOMICAL SUPPLY OF NON-

SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FUEL AND EQUIPMENT.

18. THIS FRAMEWORK WILL PROVE INADEQUATE, HOWEVER, IF

IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WORLDWIDE COMMITMENT TO NON-

PROLIFERATION AT A FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL LEVEL.

19. WE MUST CREATE A NUCLEAR COMMUNITY IN WHICH COUNTRIES

ARE PREPARED TO PLACE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

MATERIALS USEABLE FOR EXPLOSIVES THAT ARE GENERATED BY

CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. WITHOUT POLITICAL COMMITMENT,

SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS WILL BE OF LIMITED LONG-TERM

EFFECT. WITHOUT CONTROL OF WEAPONS - USEABLE MATERIALS,

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR SUPPLY CANNOT FLOURISH.

NUCLEAR CONTROL

 $20.\,$ TO MEET GLOBAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROLS, ALONG

THE FIRST LINE OF ACTION:

-- FIRST, WE MUST LESSEN THE FEAR THAT CIVIL NUCLEAR

PROGRAMS WILL ONE DAY BE MISUSED, FOR SUCH PERCEPTIONS

CAN ONLY GENERATE RACES TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CAPABILITIES. THEREFORE, WE NOT ONLY URGE COMPREHENSIVE

ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS OVER ALL PEACEFUL

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NUCLEAR PROGRAMS BUT (WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE POSITIVE

WEIGHT IN OUR FUTURE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES

ACCEPTING SUCH SAFEGUARDS.) THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF
NUCLEAR MATERIALS, WHETHER IN USE, STORAGE OR TRANSFER,
MUST BE INCREASED. THE IAEA MUST RECEIVE THE FULL SUPPORT
OF ALL NATIONS IN MAKING ITS SAFEGUARDS AS EFFECTIVE AND
AS RELIABLE AS POSSIBLE. ANY POTENTIAL VIOLATOR OF IAEA
SAFEGUARDS MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMMEDIATE AND ADVERSE
IMPACT TO ITSELF OF SUCH A SERIOUS AFFRONT TO INTERNATIONAL

-- SECOND, WE MUST ACT DECISIVELY AGAINST THE SPREAD

OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR PRODUCING PLUTONIUM AND

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. WHICH ARE WEAPONS-USEABLE

MATERIALS. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO EXERCISE THE GREATEST

POSSIBLE RESTRAINT IN THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES FOR ENRICHING URANIUM AND EXTRACTING PLUTONIUM.

21. ADHERENCE TO SAFEGUARDS IS NECESSARY BUT NOT

SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE THAT NUCLEAR COMMERCE REMAINS

PEACEFUL. COUNTRIES WHICH SEEK TO ACQUIRE ENRICHMENT

AND REPROCESSING FACILITIES UNDER NATIONAL CONTROL, IN

DISREGARD OF ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS AND MILITARY TENSIONS, CONFIDENTIAL

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NORMS.

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MUST RECOGNIZE THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR

ACTIONS -- WHETHER OR NOT THESE IMPLICATIONS WERE

INTENDED.

NUCLEAR SUPPLY

22. NATIONS ACCEPTING EFFECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION

RESTRAINTS HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT RELIABLE AND ECONOMICAL SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED, NON-SENSITIVE FUEL. TO MOVE EFFECTIVELY ALONG THIS SECOND LINE OF ACTION, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THESE CONCRETE AND FORWARD STEPS:

-- WE URGE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO OFFER AND NUCLEAR

CONSUMERS TO ACCEPT SAFE AND ECONOMICAL NUCLEAR FUEL

SERVICES INSTEAD OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN ALL

FUTURE NUCLEAR COMMERCE. MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO

SUPPORT THIS APPROACH, TO EXPAND ITS CAPACITY TO MEET

ALL FUTURE DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR FUEL FROM COUNTRIES NOT

CONTRIBUTING TO THE SPREAD OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

-- WE PROPOSE TO CONSIDER WAYS OF (POOLING OUR RESOURCES)

WITH OTHER NATIONS TO ENSURE UNINTERRUPTED AND ECONOMICAL

SUPPLY UNDISTORTED BY COMMERCIAL RIVALRY.

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-- WE CONTINUE TO SEE MERIT IN DEVELOPING, IN

APPROPRIATE CASES, SUITABLY SITED MULTINATIONAL ALTERNA-

TIVES TO NEW NATIONAL FACILITIES, IF AND WHEN THESE

BECOME REQUIRED, AND WE COMMEND THE THOROUGH STUDY BEING

CONDUCTED BY THE IAEA IN THIS AREA.

NUCLEAR COMMUNITY

23. A RATIONAL BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR CONTROL AND

NUCLEAR SUPPLY MUST DEPEND, MOST FUNDAMENTALLY, ON THE

POLITICAL WILL OF NATIONS TO FOREGO, IN FACT AND IN

APPEARANCE, OPTIONS FOR MAKING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. WE
THEREFORE URGE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE ADHERENCE TO THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH HAS BEEN RATIFIED BY GROWING
NUMBERS OF STATES, INCLUDING SOME OF THE LARGEST NUCLEAR
INDUSTRIAL POWERS IN THE WORLD. WE WELCOME IN PARTICULAR
JAPAN'S RECENT COMPLETION OF ITS NPT RATIFICATION PROCESS
THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, ACCEPTS THAT THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS POWERS SHOULD SHOW BY THEIR OWN EXAMPLE THAT THEY
ALSO DESIRE TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVES ON THIS PLANET.

24. ALONG WITH A COMMON POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO NON-

PROLIFERATION MUST COME A COMMON DETERMINATION TO LIMIT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE ACCUMULATION OF PLUTONIUM FORMED IN NUCLEAR REACTORS

AND TO CONTAIN THE PRESSURE TO BUILD NATIONAL FACILITIES

TO PROCESS AND RECYCLE THIS MATERIAL. RELIABLE NUCLEAR

FUEL ASSURANCES AT LOWER COST WILL BE CRUCIAL IF THIS

PRESSURE IS TO BE LIMITED. (BUT BEYOND THIS, THE UNITED

STATES OFFERS THE FOLLOWING NEW APPROACHES TO DEAL

WITH THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF PLUTONIUM CONTROL WHICH MUST

BE AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:

-- WE PROPOSE THAT SECURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR STORING USED

REACTOR FUEL OR SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IN EXCESS OF CIVIL

NUCLEAR NEEDS BE ESTABLISHED UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES.

WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THIS END WITH ALL INTERESTED

STATES AND THE IAEA, WHOSE CHARTER PERMITS IT TO ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES. PRESIDENT FORD HAS DIRECTED THE CONTRIBUTION OF U.S.RESOURCES AND FACILITIES TO THIS END, AND HAS EXPRESSED OUR READINESS TO STORE OUR OWN EXCESS CIVIL SPENT FUEL AND PLUTONIUM UNDER IAEA AUSPICES.

-- WE PROPOSE THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE DEVELOPED TO PERMIT

AN EXCHANGE OF FRESH FOR USED REACTOR FUEL UNDER EQUITABLE

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PROCESSING TO EXISTING FACILITIES.

TERMS, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL STORAGE AND FOR LIMITING EVENTUAL RE-

-- AND WE PROPOSE THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO
AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK WHICH WOULD COORDINATE
NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY, EXCHANGE, AND STORAGE, WITH THE AIM OF
HELPING TO ENSURE FRESH REACTOR FUEL SUPPLY AND REALIZING
ANY EVENTUAL VALUE OF REACTOR OUTPUT.)

NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES

25. THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION DEMANDS CANDOR. IT CAN
PERHAPS BE MANAGED -- BUT ONLY PARTIALLY AND TEMPORARILY -BY TECHNICAL MEASURES. IT CAN BE SOLVED, HOWEVER, IF
ALL OF US FACE THE PROBLEM REALISTICALLY. THESE REALITIES
ARE FUNDAMENTALLY POLITICAL, RELATING TO THE DETERMINATION
AND FORESIGHT OF LEADERS IN RESISTING PERCEIVED SHORTTERM ADVANTAGES IN FAVOR OF FUNDAMENTAL LONG-TERM GAINS.

ALL LEADERS MUST SEE THAT THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND

COLLECTIVE INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY INTERNATIONALLY

ASSURED AND SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY, SERVICE AND

STORAGEAND BY FOREGOING ACQUISITION

OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL FACILITIES.

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26. IF WE CAN MOVE TOGETHER CONSTRUCTIVELY AND COOPERA-

TIVELY IN MANAGING OUR COMMON NUCLEAR PROBLEMS. WE WILL

NOT ONLY ENHANCE OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY BUT WE WILL BE

BETTER ABLE TO CONCENTRATE OUR ENERGIES AND OUR RESOURCES

ON THE GREAT TASKS OF CONSTRUCTION RATHER THAN CONSUME

THEM IN A PROCESS OF INCREASINGLY DESTRUCTIVE RIVALRY.

27. NO CHALLENGE BEFORE THE WORLD COMMUNITY IS MORE

COMPLEX OR MORE CRITICAL THAN THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR

PROLIFERATION. IN NO AREA OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN DOES

THE FUTURE OF THIS PLANET DEPEND MORE DIRECTLY UPON WHAT

THIS GENERATION ELECTS TO DO -- OR NOT TO DO. THE WORLD

COMMUNITY NOW CONFRONTS A CHOICE -- TO SEEK RATIONAL AND

COOPERATIVE ACTION TO SAFELY UTILIZE THE POTENTIAL OF

NUCLEAR POWERS FOR PEACEFUL PROGRESS, OR, THROUGH NEGLECT,

NARROW PREOCCUPATIONS, OR SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS, TO CONDEMN

OUR CHILDREN'S LIVES TO A PERVASIVE THREAT OF NUCLEAR

CATASTROPHE.

28. WE ARE FACED WITH A DILEMMA OF THE UTMOST SEVERITY

BUT IT IS FULLY WITHIN OUR CAPACITY TO RESOLVE IT. WE

CAN MEET THE IMPERATIVE OF PEACE AND ADVANCE OUR COMMON
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PROGRESS. THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HISTORY HAS PLACED
UPON US IS CLEAR. LET US HAVE THE GOOD SENSE TO SEE BEYOND
THE INTERESTS AND AMBITIONS OF THE MOMENT. LET US
SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE MOMENT, BEFORE THE PERILS
OF THE FUTURE ENGULF US. END TEXT. ROBINSON
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